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THE U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC NUCLEAR 
PARTNERSHIP: A DEBILITATING BLOW TO 
THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
INTRODUCTION 
n July of 2005, the United States and India announced their coopera-
tive agreement on nuclear proliferation. Policy analysts see this de-
velopment as a realpolitik move by the United States in balancing an 
increasingly competitive China.1 As a legal matter, this agreement raises 
compelling issues about the United States’ compliance with the 1968 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (“NPT”)2 and India’s status as a legally 
“unrecognized” nuclear weapons state (“NWS”).3 Interestingly, by the 
terms of the NPT and pursuant to statutory law of the United States, 
“non-nuclear weapon states” as recipients of nuclear transfers need not 
be parties to the NPT or other arms control agreements.4 Under U.S. law, 
                                                                                                             
 1. George Perkovich, Policy Outlook: Faulty Promises, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Sept. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.carnegieendowment 
.org/files/PO21.Perkovich.pdf. 
 2. Multilateral Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]; see also United Nations [U.N.], 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.un.org/Depts/dda 
/WMD/treaty (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). The U.N. explains that: 
[t]he NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote co-operation in 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear 
disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the 
only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by 
the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered 
into force in 1970. A total of 187 parties have joined the Treaty, including the 
five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any 
other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s 
significance. 
Id.  
 3. Article IX of the NPT defines a nuclear weapon state (“NWS”) as one that had 
“manufactured or exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 
January 1, 1967.” NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. India con-
ducted a “peaceful” nuclear test in 1974. See infra notes 66–80 and accompanying text. 
 4. Article IV(1) of the NPT recognizes the “inalienable right of all Parties to the 
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
without discrimination. . . .” The pertinent portion of paragraph 2 reads,  
Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing 
alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further 
development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, espe-
I 
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pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the main requirement for 
allowing nuclear exports is that the recipient state bring all its peaceful 
nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) 
safeguards.5 Even this requirement can be waived by a presidential de-
termination that adhering to the policy would be “seriously prejudicial to 
achievement of United States non-proliferation objectives or otherwise 
jeopardize the common defense and security.”6 India was a beneficiary of 
this exemption in the past and the proposed U.S.-India nuclear coopera-
tion agreement would, in effect, be a permanent exemption.7 
Proponents of the agreement argue that it will enhance India’s compli-
ance with non-proliferation in exchange for the promises of nuclear trade 
liberalization between the two countries.8 Thus, the effects of this agree-
                                                                                                             
cially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with 
due consideration for the needs of the developing world.  
NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169 (emphasis added). This para-
graph makes it clear that parties to the NPT can further nuclear development in non-party 
states without violating the treaty particularly in light of the special allowance made for 
non-NWS in the final clause. Id. 
The United States echoes this policy in its statutory law. See Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 § 203, 22 U.S.C. § 3243 (2006) (paragraph 1 expresses the need 
to adopt principles and procedures in the event that a nation violates any “material obliga-
tion” with respect to the peaceful use of nuclear materials” and expressly distinguishes 
NPT party states as a subset of those who would be eligible for peaceful use of nuclear 
energy). 
 5. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (2006) (allowing for cooperation 
with “non-nuclear weapon states” provided that they maintain International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (“IAEA”) safeguards, discussed infra, on all nuclear materials in all peace-
ful activities within their territory). The IAEA was established in 1957 amidst growing 
fears of a global nuclear war and took root in President Eisenhower’s famous “Atoms for 
Peace” speech. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], About IAEA, http:// 
www.iaea.org/About/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). Currently, the IAEA prom-
ulgates standard “safeguards” that protect against the diversion of nuclear materials into 
bomb-making uses:  
The IAEA inspects nuclear and related facilities under safeguards agreements 
with more than 140 States. Most agreements are with States that have interna-
tionally committed themselves not to possess nuclear weapons. They are con-
cluded pursuant to the global Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT), for which the IAEA is the verification authority.  
IAEA, Our Work, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/index.html (last visited Mar. 10,  
2008). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (a)(9). 
 7. India’s past exemption is discussed infra in Part I. 
 8. Hearing on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative: Prepared Remarks 
before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Robert G. Jo-
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ment can be cast in a light that heralds the addition of a major nuclear 
weapons state into the broader non-proliferation regime.9 Conversely, the 
agreement can be construed as a threat to the already weak international 
ordering of nuclear non-proliferation given that India is not a signatory to 
the NPT and therefore does not bear the same international obligations 
that were undertaken by the five recognized nuclear weapons states 
(“NWS”).10 
Part I of this Note will examine the terms of the India-U.S. nuclear deal 
and consider potential obstacles to implementing the terms in light of 
existing IAEA safeguards. The analysis will employ the theory of inter-
national regimes, which envisions states developing “shared expectations 
of behavior” that lead to “consistent practices converging around specific 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures.”11 Adopting 
the regime theory as a model, this Note argues that India’s behavioral 
patterns in the nuclear-proliferation arena have demonstrated its unwill-
ingness to share in the principles embraced by the non-proliferation re-
gime and therefore the U.S.-India agreement is a premature liberalization 
of nuclear-trade when it is not remotely apparent that India intends to 
commit itself to the ambitious goals of the NPT. 
Second, because the agreement is a bilateral measure between India 
and the United States that stands apart from the multilateral non-
proliferation community, the enforceability of treaties and agreements 
within that regime will become severely undermined if due care is not 
taken to assure the remainder of states that those agreements still reflect 
the policy goals common to the major NWS. Specifically, Part II will 
emphasize the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(“ABMT”) 12 and its failure to ratify the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban 
                                                                                                             
seph, Under Sec’y for Arms Control and Int’l Sec., Dep’t of State), available at http:// 
www.state.gov/t/us/rm/55968.htm. 
 9. “Most recognize the need to come to terms with India and not to allow it to re-
main completely outside the international non-proliferation system.” Id. 
 10. The big five NWS are: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and 
China. One such obligation common to all NWS is the cessation of production of fissile 
materials (discussed infra) for weapons purposes. Perkovich, supra note 1, at 8. 
 11. Edward M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agree-
ments, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549, 1592 (1991) (discussing the utility of international re-
gime theory and domestic relational theory to supplement existing consent-based rules 
with the hope of understanding state compliance with/defection from evolving interna-
tional obligations). 
 12. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 
26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABMT] (bilateral treaty limiting the United States 
and Soviet Union from employing missile defense systems that would spur on their of-
fensive weapons race discussed in detail infra Part II). 
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Treaty (“CTBT”).13 It will also highlight India’s conspicuous rejection of 
all relevant multilateral nuclear arms instruments. In light of these two 
behavioral patterns, the U.S.-India partnership is a stark rejection by both 
states of international customary law that embraces the brokering of nu-
clear-weapons-free zones (“NWFZs”) and multi-lateral disarmament 
measures.14 Part II of this Note will utilize Professor Thomas M. 
Franck’s15 theory of legitimacy among nations to argue that the liberali-
zation of nuclear trade between the two states has the potential to under-
mine the legitimacy of existing multilateral nuclear-weapons free zones 
in two distinct ways: 1) by establishing a practice that is inconsistent 
with and rationally unexceptionable from the customary practice of states 
entering multilateral agreements on non-proliferation, hence undermin-
ing the regime’s coherence16 and 2) by contravening the expectations of 
                                                                                                             
 13. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 
1439 [hereinafter CTBT] (multilateral treaty banning the testing of any nuclear explosive 
device yet to enter into force due to its strict entry-into-force provision discussed in detail 
infra Part II). 
 14. The nuclear-weapons-free zones (“NWFZs”) discussed in this Note are not repre-
sentative of all such agreements now in existence. In addition to the 1968 Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons In Latin America, opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 6 
I.L.M. 521 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco] and the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free 
Zone Treaty, opened for signature Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Rarotonga] (discussed in Part II infra), the following treaties have established NWFZs: 
Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 1961 WL 62657 (U.S. is a party and has 
ratified, India has acceded); Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, 
opened for signature Dec. 15, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 635 (entered into force 1997 after ratifica-
tions by Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philip-
pines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Protocol inviting a non-use promise of 
nuclear weapons against states party to the treaty has not been signed or ratified by any of 
the five official NWS); African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature 
Apr. 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698 (conducted under the auspices of the Organization of Afri-
can Unity (“OAU”), this treaty will enter into force upon the deposit of the twenty-eighth 
instrument). As of November 2005, there were twenty ratifications and the United States 
has signed but not ratified the non-use Protocol. See List of Countries That Have Signed, 
Ratified/Acceded to the African NWFZ Treaty, http://www.africaunion.org/Official_ 
documents/Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/List/Pelindaba%20Treaty.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2008). For recent updates on the status of various NWFZs, see Agency 
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
http://www.opanal.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 15. Thomas Franck is considered one of the leading scholars in international legal 
theory and is a Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law Emeritus at New York Univer-
sity. New York University Faculty Profiles, http://its.law.nyu.edu/faculty/profiles/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=bio.main&personID=19925 (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 16. “[W]hen states do not act consistently, no principle of general application appears 
on the surface of what looks like an erratic pattern of conduct. States may thus conclude 
that there is, and can be, no legitimate rule to command their adherence.” THOMAS M. 
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states party to such agreements, bringing into question the determinacy 
of rules that structure relationships between NPT and non-NPT signato-
ries, and ultimately decreasing the non-proliferation regime’s “compli-
ance-pull.”17 
Third, the U.S.-India agreement must be read in the context of the yet-
to-be-resolved conflict between India and its bitter rival, Pakistan.18 In 
the context of the current agreement, because Pakistan is likewise a non-
signatory of any international non-proliferation treaties and China is 
widely recognized as having furthered proliferation in Pakistan, there is 
no reason to believe that a similar cooperative agreement could not 
emerge between Pakistan and China to balance the U.S-India align-
ment.19 Alternatively, even if such a formal agreement were implausible, 
the very existence of a U.S.-India partnership gives Pakistan a substantial 
incentive to surreptitiously pursue illicit proliferation measures to as-
suage its security concerns.20 This would certainly not be uncharacteristic 
of Pakistani behavior in the realm of nuclear arms given that the Paki-
stani government infamously enabled A.Q. Khan to engineer his illicit 
nuclear arms smuggling ring.21 Part III of this Note will analyze the U.S.-
India agreement through the lens of the game theory model, the pris-
                                                                                                             
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 174 (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) 
(explaining that coherent application of a rule plays a vital role in shaping perceptions of 
the rule’s legitimacy). 
 17. Id. at 42–43. 
 18. The animosity between the two states dates back to the Partition of 1947 follow-
ing the British withdrawal from its colonial seat, which divided the sub-continent into the 
Islamic Nation of Pakistan and a secular India. This Note will not delve into the details of 
Indo-Pakistani tensions but rather highlight the imprudence of the U.S.-India nuclear 
partnership in light of this regional dilemma. See India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations, 
BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_ 
Pakistan/timeline/default.stm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008) (providing a brief timeline that 
describes the above stated events in more detail). 
 19. In fact, certain technology transfers between China and Pakistan may very well 
already be “grandfathered in” as a response to the U.S.-India partnership. See discussion 
infra notes 175–178 and accompanying text. 
 20. Indo-Asian News Service, Pakistan Nuclear Authority Concerned Over US-India 
Deal, YAHOO! INDIA NEWS, Apr. 12, 2006, http://in.news.yahoo.com/060412/43/ 
63i3u.html. See also Seema Sridhar, India-US Defence Agreement: Impact on Indo-Pak 
Peace Process, INSTITUTE OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, July 28, 2005, http:// 
www.ipcs.org/Pak_articles2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=1817&country=1016&statu
s=article&mod=a. 
 21. Commander Kevin M. Brew, The Re-Emergence of Nuclear Weapons as “The 
Coin of The Realm” and the Return of Nuclear Brinkmanship in South Asia: The Nuclear 
Sword of Damocles Still Hangs by a Thread, 52 NAVAL L. REV. 177, 191–92 (2005). 
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oner’s dilemma.22 In this context, the primary players are India and Paki-
stan, regional nuclear rivals who have clashed in several wars over the 
past five decades and maintained low-level conflict across their shared 
border in the state of Kashmir. In the prisoner’s dilemma, both players 
have an offensive incentive to defect from any agreement or understand-
ing that intends to avoid escalation or rekindling of conflict.23 Therefore, 
given this backdrop in the sub-continent, an agreement that aligns India’s 
security interests with that of the United States can only exacerbate Paki-
stan’s defensive incentives. Any half-hearted efforts to secure assurances 
from Pakistan that it will place a moratorium on production of fissile ma-
terial24 for nuclear weapons “would be foolhardy” given that states with 
an offensive incentive to defect have the concomitant incentive to mis-
lead others about their compliance.25 Thus, assurances are unsatisfactory 
substitutes to fill the void of international legal instruments governing 
weapons proliferation in the sub-continent. 
Finally, this Note concludes that the U.S.-India agreement stands in 
stark contradiction to the international interests in non-proliferation, let 
alone disarmament. That is, the weaknesses of IAEA safeguards, particu-
larly in the verification and enforcement respects, coupled with the pre-
carious state of international non-proliferation instruments as affected by 
the conduct of the United States, taken in light of the regional security 
dilemma enmeshed in the South Asian sub-continent promise that the 
U.S.-India nuclear deal will, over time, undo what little progress has 
been made in this intractable field of international law. 
I. THE U.S.-INDIA PARTNERSHIP AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME 
On July 27, 2006, the United States House of Representatives sup-
ported the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
                                                                                                             
 22. In this model, the players are confronted with a collective action problem in 
which no player can be sure what course of action the other players will take and unilat-
eral defection from the collective purpose can produce the greatest individual benefits. 
Arms control presents precisely such a predicament. See discussion infra notes 181–204 
and accompanying text. For more on game theory as applied to arms control, see Kenneth 
W. Abbott, “Trust but Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties 
and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1 (1993). 
 23. Id. at 26. 
 24. Fissile material refers to the substance that results when uranium is highly en-
riched or plutonium is separated from the spent nuclear fuel. Both forms are used to pro-
duce nuclear weapons. See Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Fissile Ma-
terial Basics, http://www.ieer.org/fctsheet/fm_basic.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008). 
 25. Abbot, supra note 22. Regarding U.S. policy objectives related to Pakistan and 
the U.S.-India nuclear deal, see United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation 
Act of 2006, H.R. 5682, 109th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2006). 
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Cooperation Act (“the Act”) by a majority of 359 to 68.26 On November 
16, 2006, the Senate passed the bill with several amendments; the overall 
effect of the act is to waive restrictions under the aforementioned 1954 
Atomic Energy Act27 and exempt India from applying full-scope safe-
guards (“FSS”) on all its nuclear facilities.28 The significant bipartisan 
support this bill has enjoyed can, in part, be explained by the prospect 
that the contemplated partnership is slated to generate $100 billion in 
energy sales for U.S. companies.29 
At this juncture it would be beneficial to clarify the legal standing of 
the partnership that the Act envisions. The agreement is not a treaty but 
rather a “strategic partnership.”30 In order for the agreement’s terms (dis-
cussed in greater detail below) to be carried out, the United States must 
first amend the 1954 Atomic Energy Act excepting India from full-scope 
safeguard restrictions.31 This has virtually been accomplished as the bill 
awaits the President’s signature. Once amended, the United States and 
India would enter into what is known as a “123 cooperative agreement” 
under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, which would embody the 
actual terms of the deal.32 Even after domestic legislation is amended, the 
                                                                                                             
 26. Lea Terhune, U.S. House of Representatives Approves U.S.-India Nuclear Deal, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, July 27, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html? 
p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=July&x=20060727121049mlenuhret3.629702e-02. See 
United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, H.R. 5682, 109th Cong. 
(2d. Sess. 2006). 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 2153. 
 28. Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, 22 
U.S.C. § 8003 (2006). The bill was co-sponsored by a bipartisan contingency comprised 
of twelve Democrats and twenty-two Republicans. United States-India Peaceful Atomic 
Energy Cooperation Act 2006, Bill Tracking H.R. 5682, 109th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2006). 
 29. Judy Mathewson, U.S.-India Nuclear Deal May Stall in Congress as Time Runs 
Out, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 22, 2006, http://www.ransac.org/Projects%20and%20 
Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/2006/926200693510AM.html#2G. 
 30. Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: United States and India: Strategic Part-
nership, Mar. 2, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060302-
13.html; Telephone Interview with Katherine Schultz, India Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
in Washington, D.C., [hereinafter Shultz Interview] (Nov. 9, 2006). 
 31. Schultz Interview, supra note 30. 
 32. Id. Schultz expressed that the agreement would not be a promise of unrestricted 
trade in nuclear technology. This suggests the agreement is less than a binding exchange 
of promises but rather an exchange of conditional assurances. The danger in this ar-
rangement is if India is found to be non-compliant with the terms and the United States 
suspends or terminates performance under section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act, India 
could argue that its facilities are no longer legally bound to IAEA safeguards. This fear 
was prevalent during the previous U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement that supplied 
technology to the Tarapur reactors, discussed infra notes 67–80 and accompanying text). 
See also Atomic Energy Act § 129. 
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Nuclear Suppliers Group (“NSG”), a forty-five state consortium dedi-
cated to the cessation of the spread of nuclear weapons would have to 
unanimously agree to except India from its policy proscribing transfers 
of atomic fuel and other nuclear technologies to states that are not party 
to the NPT or other non-proliferation instruments and have not adopted 
FSS.33 
While the likelihood of the NSG enthusiastically approving this 
agreement is debatable, 34 there is an unquestionable need for solemn 
reflection on the partnership’s legal implications for the non-proliferation 
regime. According to Esther Pan of the Council on Foreign Relations, the 
agreement consists of the following terms: 
1. India agrees to allow inspectors from the International Atomic En-
ergy Association (IAEA), the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog group, 
access to its civilian nuclear program. But India would decide which of 
its many nuclear facilities to classify as civilian. . . . Teresita Schaffer, 
director of the South Asia program at the Center for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies, says these will now include domestically built 
plants, which India has not been willing to safeguard before now. Mili-
tary facilities—and stockpiles of nuclear fuel that India has produced 
up to now—will be exempt from inspections or safeguards. 
2. India commits to signing an Additional Protocol—which allows 
more intrusive IAEA inspections—of its civilian facilities. 
3. India agrees to continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. 
4. India commits to strengthening the security of its nuclear arsenals. 
5. India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 
(FMCT) with the United States banning the production of fissile mate-
rial for weapons purposes. India agrees to prevent the spread of en-
richment and reprocessing technologies to states that don’t possess 
them and to support international non-proliferation efforts. 
                                                                                                             
 33. Schultz Interview, supra note 30. To reiterate, full-scope safeguards (“FSS”) sig-
nify the oversight of the IAEA on all peaceful nuclear activities of a state and obtain the 
result of monitoring the use of spent nuclear fuel to ensure that it is not being diverted for 
weapons production. International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Communications 
Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear 
Material, Equipment and Technology, INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1, Mar. 2006, at para. 4. 
The application of FSS to all of a state’s peaceful nuclear activities is effective when 
applied to non-nuclear weapon states because all of their nuclear capability is presump-
tively non-military. Because India already has nuclear weapons capability, FSS will not 
achieve the comprehensive oversight it is designed to impose. 
 34. See discussion infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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6. U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and 
provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy program. 35 
A. Weaknesses Inherent in the IAEA Structure Will Carry Over to the 
U.S.-India Deal 
The first term, which allows India to select the facilities that will be 
subject to safeguards, bespeaks of the limitations inherent in the nuclear 
arrangement that India and the U.S. seek to consummate. Given that the 
application of IAEA safeguards is predicated on a state’s declaration of 
what is and is not a civilian (as opposed to military) facility, the declara-
tion is unrepresentative of a state’s actual production and use of nuclear 
materials, namely any use directed at weapons production.36 This distinc-
tion between “civilian” and “military” facilities is embedded in the archi-
tecture of the IAEA and applies to all the recognized NWS, thereby enti-
tling them to harbor un-safeguarded military facilities; this is, in effect, 
the regime’s deference to each NWS state’s sovereign right to self-
defense.37 While India is not bound by the NPT, the joint statement is-
sued by the United States and India committed India “to assume the same 
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advan-
tages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such 
as the United States.”38 Assuming that the NPT’s underlying obligations 
can be extended to India by association, the safeguard provisions appli-
cable to contracting parties of the NPT themselves offer significant al-
lowances that exempt certain nuclear material from the IAEA’s vigil. 
Paragraphs 14 and 37 of the IAEA’s guidelines for safeguarding agree-
                                                                                                             
 35. Esther Pan, The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal¸ Backgrounder, Council on Foreign 
Relations, Feb. 24, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9663/usindia_nuclear_deal.html 
#2. 
 36. In other words, classifying certain facilities as civilian and excluding others nec-
essarily means that India intends to retain exclusive and opaque control over its military 
uses for nuclear materials. As mentioned supra at note 24, spent nuclear fuel can yield 
plutonium, which can then be used to produce nuclear weapons. Having thus far operated 
its facilities largely beyond the reach of international oversight, Esther Pan suggests that 
India has already accumulated significant amounts of weapons-grade material not subject 
to any safeguards on its future use. Pan, supra note 35.  
 37. “The safeguards system comprises measures by which the Agency independently 
verifies the declarations made by States about their nuclear material and activities.” 
IAEA, About Safeguards, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/about.html (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2008). However, the scope of the IAEA’s duty only ensures safeguards 
on all of a contracting state’s nuclear material in all its peaceful nuclear activities. IAEA, 
The Safeguards System of the International Atomic Energy Agency, at 2, http:// 
www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 38. Press Release, India-U.S. Joint Statement, EMBASSY OF INDIA, July 18, 2005, 
http://www.indianembassy.org/press_release/2005/July/21.htm. 
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ments allow for exemptions from safeguards at the discretionary request 
of a state.39 Paragraph 37 imposes certain quantitative limitations on ex-
empted nuclear materials and parties to the Additional Protocol40 must 
declare the amounts, locations, and uses of such materials.41 
                                                                                                             
 39. Paragraph 14 reads:  
The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion 
to use nuclear material which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nu-
clear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the 
Agreement, the following procedures will apply: 
a. The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear: 
i. That the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military 
activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have 
given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the nu-
clear material will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and 
ii. That during the period of non-application of safeguards the nu-
clear material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices; 
b. The Agency and the State shall make an arrangement so that, only while the 
nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in the 
Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent 
possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be ap-
plied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement shall again 
apply as soon as the nuclear material is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear ac-
tivity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition 
of such unsafeguarded nuclear material in the State and of any exports of such 
material; and 
c. Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. The 
Agency’s agreement shall be given as promptly as possible; it shall only relate 
to the temporal and procedural provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but 
shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity 
or relate to the use of the nuclear material therein. 
The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in 
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Unofficial 
version INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) June 1972 [hereinafter IAEA Structure and Content] 
available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/index.html (last visited 
Mar 10, 2008) (emphasis in original).  
 40. The Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, under article 5, 
requires party states to provide the agency with access to “any place on a site” where the 
word “site,” under article 18, is defined as the location of an active or decommissioned 
civilian facility and any adjacent locations where nuclear materials are used or locations 
that are essential to serving nuclear facilities. Model Protocol Additional to the Agree-
ment(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Applica-
tion of Safeguards, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), International Atomic Energy Agency 
2008] U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARTNERSHIP 729 
By allowing a state to temporarily exempt certain materials from safe-
guarding and acknowledging that these materials could be diverted for 
“non-proscribed” military purposes, the IAEA has effectively provided 
every state with a loophole that could be used to legitimize activities that 
may in fact be directed towards weapons proliferation. This is not to say 
that the safeguarding system is completely impotent in carrying out its 
mandate. By requiring states to declare the amounts and locations of nu-
clear fuel circulating in their civilian facilities and allowing for intrusive 
inspections, the IAEA has provided for means to confirm the accuracy as 
well as completeness of a state’s representations.42 Signatories of the Ad-
ditional Protocol must, pursuant to article 5, provide the IAEA with ac-
cess to sites containing safeguard-exempt material or, where access is not 
forthcoming, must make other reasonable efforts to fulfill IAEA re-
quirements.43 
B. Insufficient Attention Has Been Paid to the Legal Implications of a 
Stand-Alone Bilateral Agreement between India and the United States 
For U.S. lawmakers and the administration, India’s good standing in 
the international community, which it has earned over the years, informs 
the decision to promote the cooperative agreement.44 While this is not an 
invalid starting point, advocates of the partnership pay insufficient cre-
dence and respect to the legal implications of a stand-alone bilateral 
agreement with the United States that subjects India’s activities to IAEA 
safeguards versus obligations it would have as a party to the NPT. At 
first glance, one might argue that, by accepting IAEA safeguards, India 
has essentially been allowed in as a de facto NPT state and therefore is 
under the same obligations as other NWS parties. A closer comparison 
between the provisions of the NPT and the model safeguards agreement 
reveals that under a stand-alone bilateral agreement, the United States 
and India have left room for significant divergences from non-
                                                                                                             
available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/index.html [hereinafter IAEA 
Additional Model Protocol] (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 41. Id. at art. 2 (vii)(a) & (b). 
 42. According to the Agency, “completeness” was a factor that did not become of 
great concern until the discovery of Iraq’s clandestine weapons program. See IAEA, The 
Safeguards System of the International Atomic Agency, supra note 37, at 4. 
 43. IAEA Additional Model Protocol, supra note 40, at art. 5. 
 44. See Hearing on U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, supra note 8 
(“India has clearly demonstrated over the past several years its desire to work with the 
United States and the international community to fight the spread of sensitive nuclear 
technologies.”) 
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proliferation goals to the prejudice of the control regimes and other par-
ties to the NPT. 
Article I of the NPT reads, 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to trans-
fer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, en-
courage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, 
or control over such weapons or explosive devices.45 
A strict constructionist interpretation of this provision would support a 
strong argument that the agreement can potentially bring the United 
States in violation of article I. As mentioned above, India is to this day, 
under the terms of the NPT, a “non-nuclear weapons state” since, under 
article IX, it did not explode a device until after January 1, 1967. If tech-
nologies acquired by India through its liberalized relationship with the 
United States are diverted to support its existing weapons systems or to 
enhance aspects thereof, the United States would be in direct violation of 
article I. Since nothing in the agreement indicates that India has commit-
ted to an explicit cessation of any and all development of nuclear weap-
ons technology, such a scenario is well within the realm of probability.46 
Given the broad language of the prohibition, one could even argue that a 
Pakistan that is threatened by the U.S.-India alignment could be “induced 
indirectly” by the United States to proliferate nuclear weapons in order to 
increase its deterrence level. This would also be a violation of article I of 
the NPT. 
An even more probable difficulty that could arise is the issue relating 
to transfers/retransfers of technology. When considering this topic, four 
bodies of law are relevant to the discussion: the NPT, the IAEA safe-
guards agreement, and the domestic export laws of the United States and 
India. As discussed above, article I of the NPT adopts broad language 
that prohibits a state from transferring nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
devices both directly or indirectly and prohibits “inducing” a state to ac-
quire the same. India, as a non-party to this treaty, would not be bound 
by this provision. Therefore the remaining bodies of law governing its 
                                                                                                             
 45. NPT, supra note 2, U.S.T. at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166. 
 46. In fact, part of the agreement is to pursue cooperation on issues of national secu-
rity and defense. See Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: United States and India: 
Strategic Partnership, supra note 30 (“The United States reaffirmed its goal to help meet 
India’s defense needs and to provide the important technologies and capabilities that 
India seeks.”). 
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transfer are limited to the IAEA safeguards and provisions in U.S. and 
Indian export laws. 
A careful scrutiny of the requirements governing transfers under the 
IAEA safeguards agreement indicates that the agency exercises only a 
post-hoc review capacity over transfer agreements between a safe-
guarded state and a receiving state. Paragraph 92 of the IAEA document, 
which promulgates requirements for safeguard agreements, reads: 
The Agreement should provide that any intended transfer out of the 
State of safeguarded nuclear material in an amount exceeding one ef-
fective kilogram, or by successive shipments to the same State within a 
period of three months each of less than one effective kilogram but ex-
ceeding in total one effective kilogram, shall be notified to the Agency 
after the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the 
transfer and normally at least two weeks before the nuclear material is 
to be prepared for shipping.47 
This provision clearly adopts a deferential approach to interstate trans-
actions in nuclear materials given that it allows for the fruition of a con-
tract before any notice is required from a state of its intentions to transfer 
sensitive safeguarded materials. What is more, it only allows a two week 
window between time of notice and delivery of such materials, within 
which the IAEA may take actions only to confirm the amounts of nuclear 
material being shipped and its destinations.48 Furthermore, and in per-
haps its most prostrate and submissive statement, the IAEA qualifies its 
oversight duties with this: “However, the transfer of the nuclear material 
shall not be delayed in any way by any action taken or contemplated by 
the Agency pursuant to this notification.”49 If a contractual relationship 
comes into being and the transferor gives only two weeks notice to the 
relevant “authority” regarding the transfer of sensitive nuclear materials, 
it defies reason to maintain that the IAEA has any preventive value if it 
cannot stay or abate what it deems an unsafe transfer of nuclear materi-
als. Lastly, it should not come as a surprise that a state subject to a safe-
guard agreement is not obligated to ensure that a recipient state of its 
transfers adheres to or is also subject to IAEA safeguards.50 All that is 
required is that the receiving state notifies the IAEA of the successful 
receipt of the materials declared to have been transferred by the state of 
origin.51 
                                                                                                             
 47. IAEA Structure and Content, supra note 42 (emphasis in original). 
 48. Id. at para. 93. 
 49. Id. (emphasis in original).  
 50. Id. at para 94. 
 51. Id. 
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In light of this apparent shortcoming of the agency’s oversight and re-
view capacity, one is forced to turn to each country’s domestic export 
laws to find a more rigid review mechanism. However, if this is con-
ceded as the only reliable means of oversight, it is also conceded that 
each country is entitled to make its own authoritative interpretation of 
NPT article I, regardless of whether it is consistent with the NPT’s goals 
of non-proliferation. Each country may interpret what constitutes “di-
rect” or “indirect” transfers, whether its actions truly “assist, encourage 
or induce” another to acquire nuclear weapons, or even what constitutes 
the “manufacture” and “acquisition” of nuclear weapons. As troubling as 
this observation may be, whatever semblance of authority the NPT does 
retain would be squandered if India were allowed to “end-run” the 
treaty’s obligations and only needed to commit to select safeguards under 
the IAEA. In pursuing this policy initiative, the United States has tacitly 
rebuffed the NPT’s relevance to non-proliferation goals, thereby under-
mining the regime’s capability to foster “shared expectations of behav-
ior” between states and increasing the likelihood of states acting unilater-
ally to thwart its overall vision.52 
C. The U.S.-India Agreement is a Premature Liberalization of Nuclear 
Trade When it is not Remotely Apparent that India Intends to Commit 
Itself to the Ambitious Goals of the NPT Regime 
Despite its weaknesses, the NPT’s strength as an international legal in-
stitution derives from the widespread deference it has obtained through 
its ratification by 187 countries that have accepted its ambitious goals of 
non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.53 
Inconsistencies in practice amounting to non-compliance do not necessi-
tate a finding that the regime lacks legal significance.54 However, when a 
state stands apart from the NPT, rejects its very architecture but never-
theless leverages the regime’s visions of peaceful nuclear use to obtain 
materials essential to the production of nuclear weapons, one can con-
clude that a widely shared sense of obligation to pursue non-proliferation 
is not extant in the minds of Indian policymakers. 
                                                                                                             
 52. Smith, supra note 11, at 1592. 
 53. These goals are often referred to as the “three pillars” of the NPT. See United 
Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2; FRIEDRICH 
V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND 
LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 62–63 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 1989). For data of number of NPT ratifications, see United Nations, Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2. 
 54. Smith, supra note 11, at 1589. 
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In the October 1998 issue of Foreign Affairs, Jaswant Singh, Senior 
Adviser on Defense and Foreign Affairs to then Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee published an article defending India’s May 1998 
nuclear tests. The tests had shocked the world and ushered in India as a 
de facto nuclear-weapons state. In explicating India’s security dilemma, 
Mr. Singh essentially asserted India’s sovereign right to employ nuclear 
weapons as a means to secure its national interests just as the existing 
five NWS had done.55 However, this assertion was grounded in a much 
broader assessment of the state of nuclear weapons: 
The Americas are under the U.S. nuclear deterrent as members of the 
Organization of American States. South Korea, Japan, and Australasia 
are also under the U.S. umbrella. China is, of course, a major nuclear 
power. Only Africa and southern Asia remain outside this new interna-
tional nuclear paradigm where nuclear weapons and their role in inter-
national conduct are paradoxically legitimized. These differentiated 
standards of national security–a sort of international nuclear apartheid–
are not simply a challenge to India but demonstrate the inequality of the 
entire non-proliferation regime.56 
Speaking for the entire sub-continent and the continent of Africa, Mr. 
Singh articulates a dangerous proposition that any state not under a nu-
clear “umbrella” may rightfully assert its entitlement to acquire nuclear-
weapons capability. While this position is defensible under a strict posi-
tivist construction of statehood and security, the fact that South Asian 
countries such as Nepal and several African countries such as Cameroon 
and Zimbabwe have ratified the treaty indicates that “unsheltered” states 
feel obliged to defer to the collective decision that the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is inimical to international peace and security.57 That is, 
under international regime theory, the legitimacy and strength of a re-
gime results from the “deference to authoritative decisions that estab-
lish[] what ‘the law’ is, or from the acceptance of norm-regulated prac-
tice.”58 In the case of the NPT, the fact that 187 states have ratified the 
treaty and are bound by its provisions is indicative of an institution that 
                                                                                                             
 55. Jaswant Singh, Against Nuclear Apartheid, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept-Oct. 1998 
available at http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/js/js(foreignaffairs).html. The fact that 
this article is still available on the Indian Embassy’s Web site is itself an indication of 
India’s adherence to its position justifying its 1998 tests. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 102(2), cmt. b (1987) (The article’s 
availability can be construed as a diplomatic act that constitutes practice indicating its 
unilateral legal stance on nuclear weapons.). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 484, 729 U.N.T.S. at 162. 
 58. KRATOCHWIL, supra note 53, at 62–63 (emphasis in original).  
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induces the “acceptance of decisions as authoritative . . . which have 
been made collectively.”59 Absent an unequivocal assent by India to the 
preeminent instrument governing nuclear non-proliferation or active ef-
forts to ensure regional disarmament, a mere promise to “commit to play 
a leading role in international efforts to prevent the proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction” seems to ring hollow.60 
The third pillar of the NPT, peaceful use, is expressed in article IV, 
which recognizes the “inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to 
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful pur-
poses . . . .”61 Paragraph 2 provides for parties to “undertake to facilitate, 
and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”62 The second sentence of paragraph 2 
places an explicit onus on what can most readily be construed as the 
NWS to further development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy with an 
eye towards the needs of the developing areas of the world.63 The strik-
ing aspect of this paragraph is that it encourages cooperation, initiated 
unilaterally or otherwise, between parties to the treaty and “States or in-
ternational organizations” to further develop the application of peaceful 
nuclear energy.64 This broad language leaves open the option for an NPT 
state to engage a non-NPT state in the exchange of nuclear technology. 
However, an NPT state that does enter such a relationship, under article 
III of the NPT, must ensure that any such transfer subjects the materials 
to IAEA FSS.65 Therefore, strictly speaking, even if India’s conduct is 
consistent with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the U.S.-India 
Agreement violates the NPT on its face given the inevitable absence of 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. 
 60. Press Release, India-U.S. Joint Statement, supra note 38. 
 61. NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Paragraph 2 in its entirety reads:  
All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to par-
ticipate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific 
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties 
to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or 
together with other States or international organizations to the further develop-
ment of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in 
the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due con-
sideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.  
Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 168. 
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FSS on India’s military nuclear facilities. Even where applicable, the 
IAEA safeguards, as already discussed, are less than satisfactory in their 
verification methods. This leaves one to search for a more robust verifi-
cation scheme enmeshed in the agreements made pursuant to article IV. 
The United States has been down this road before with India. On Au-
gust 8, 1963, the United States and India entered into the Agreement for 
Cooperation for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the United States 
and India.66 The agreement was reached to facilitate the construction of a 
civil nuclear power plant near Tarapur in the state of Maharashtra.67 The 
agreement would last for thirty years and would provide India with sales 
of 
all requirements of the Government of India for enriched uranium for 
use as fuel at the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, it being understood 
that the Tarapur Atomic Power Station shall be operated on no other 
special nuclear material than that made available by the United States 
Commission and special nuclear material produced therefrom.68 
During the period of this agreement, India and the United States en-
countered several key disputes over the interpretation of the agreement’s 
term and scope of limitations on expiration.69 India asserted the right to 
use plutonium, the spent fuel from the reactors, for military purposes 
upon expiration of the thirty year term.70 Furthermore, it asserted a right 
to extract spent plutonium during the term of the agreement without re-
gard for the requirement of U.S. approved safeguards authorizing such 
action under article VI of the agreement.71 These arguments were indica-
tive of India’s intention to divert uranium (which can become explosive 
when it is highly enriched or when it is converted to plutonium by irra-
diation) acquired from the Tarapur agreement to its very active nuclear 
weapons program.72 In fact, after India tested its first “peaceful” nuclear 
explosive in 1974, it became clear that U.S. supplied heavy water73 had 
                                                                                                             
 66. India Atomic Energy: Cooperation for Civil Uses, U.S.-India, Aug. 8, 1963, 14 
U.S.T. 1484 [hereinafter Tarapur Agreement]. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Gary Milhollin, Stopping the Indian Bomb, 81 AM. J. INT’L L. 593, 594 (1987). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Tarapur Agreement, supra note 66, 14 U.S.T. at 1494;  Milhollin, supra note 69, 
at 598. 
 72. Milhollin, supra note 69, at 594. 
 73. Heavy water is involved in an alternative method that can be used to produce 
plutonium from uranium without the need for any enrichment of uranium. See Federation 
of American Scientists, Heavy Water Production, http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/ 
heavy.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
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contributed to the successful test.74 Even after this apparent failure of 
non-proliferation policy and despite its right to suspend or terminate the 
agreement “[i]n the event of noncompliance with the guarantees” 
therein,75 the United States resolved to stay engaged with India on the 
Tarapur issue in the fear that “denial of [performance] . . . would free 
India from existing safeguards on the Tarapur atomic reactor.”76 
While there are difficult policy choices to consider when making such 
decisions, the legal implications of a state’s interactions with regimes 
that govern areas of crucial and common international interest demand a 
heightened level of scrutiny. The foregoing discussion has pointed to 
India’s historic rejection of the NPT’s architecture and its behavior in 
engaging an NPT state, the United States, in order to acquire nuclear ma-
terials and ultimately subvert non-proliferation principles. One is 
unlikely to conclude that India has made any significant overtures that 
indicate that it embraces the goals of the NPT and the means the regime 
employs to achieve them.77 Therefore, an agreement between the United 
States and India cannot reasonably be said to further the development of 
“shared expectations of behavior” that are consistent with the NPT.78 In 
fact, while instances of non-compliance and deviations from the rules 
and decision-making procedures may actually further embed the re-
gime’s legal obligations given their adaptive flexibility, “substantial 
modification of the principles and norms of a regime reveals fundamental 
variations posing risks to the continuation of the regime.”79 Engaging 
India, given its stance regarding the NPT, clearly falls within the latter 
class of deviations where India’s position against the NPT is emboldened 
now that it has a major NPT-NWS state’s seal of approval. 
                                                                                                             
 74. Milhollin, supra note 69, at 595. See also Tahirih V. Lee, The Effect of Chadha on 
the Creation of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: The United States-China Agreement 
on Nuclear Energy, 2 EMORY J. INT’L DISP. RESOL. 73, 92 (1987). 
 75. Tarapur Agreement, supra note 66, 14 U.S.T. at 1494. 
 76. Lee, supra note 74, at 94 (discussing President Carter’s decision to approve an 
export license for a shipment of uranium to India, informed by concerns of un-
safeguarded facilities and the geopolitics of Soviet presence in Afghanistan, amidst Sen-
ate resolutions expressing disapproval of the shipment). 
 77. There are instances of Indian policy with respect to nuclear non-proliferation that 
could be argued to bring it within the scope of the international non-proliferation re-
gime’s principles. See discussion infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 78. Smith, supra note 11, at 1592. 
 79. Id. at 1593 (citing Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Re-
gimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2, 2 (S. Krasner ed. 1983)). 
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II. THE U.S.-INDIA PARTNERSHIP: AN AFFRONT TO MULTILATERALISM 
The U.S.-India nuclear cooperation initiative is essentially being un-
dertaken without the blessing of the multilateral non-proliferation re-
gime. What this means for the future of the regime can be ascertained 
through an analysis of Thomas M. Franck’s theory of legitimacy and tra-
ditional models.80 On the one hand, the initiative can be construed as a 
defection by the United States from the principles of the non-
proliferation regime that ultimately derogates from the regime’s capacity 
to obligate.81 On the other hand, if the United States argues that this ini-
tiative is consistent with the goals of the non-proliferation regime (which 
it fervently has)82 then the regime’s legitimacy is nevertheless dealt a 
blow, this time by an undermining of its determinacy.83 In other words, 
this would signal to the remaining states, especially those with consider-
able access to nuclear technologies, that reaching similar arrangements 
with non-NPT signatories would be acceptable behavior under the non-
proliferation regime. In either case, the consequences are the same: states 
will be induced into behavior that threatens to increase the likelihood of 
nuclear weapons proliferation. 
In order to proceed with this line of analysis, it is first necessary to es-
tablish that the non-proliferation regime embodies rules that govern state 
practice. It is a basic tenet of international law that a practice generally 
followed by states out of a sense of legal obligation gives rise to custom-
ary international law, which is binding on all states.84 The term “prac-
tice” contemplates diplomatic acts, statements of policy, or even inaction 
of a state in the face of outside-state behavior that may affect its legal 
rights.85 Therefore, the signing of international instruments itself can 
contribute to the crystallization of customary rules of international law.86 
                                                                                                             
 80. FRANCK, supra note 16. 
 81. Franck argues that disobedience of a rule does not necessarily terminate its ability 
to obligate but repeated instances of disobedience can yield an atmosphere that renders 
defection from the rule acceptable, thereby threatening the rule’s demise. Id. at 44. 
 82. See discussion infra notes 170–171 and accompanying text. 
 83. Determinacy, according to Franck, is roughly synonymous with “textual clarity,” 
in that it gives states precise prescriptions on how to conduct themselves. FRANCK, supra 
note 16, at 52. 
 84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 
102(1)(a), cmts. b, c (1987). Under comment d, a state that expresses dissent during the 
principle’s development will not be bound by the custom. Therefore, it can be said that 
India, having refused to sign the NPT from its inception, demonstrated its dissent from 
any customary law that may have developed obligating states to refrain from weapons 
proliferation. Id. at § 102(1)(a), cmt. d.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at § 102(1)(a), cmt. i. 
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In this vein, it is a testament to the existence of a customary law that 187 
countries have ratified the NPT, making it the most widely accepted arms 
limiting or disarmament instrument in history.87 
Second, the existence of nuclear weapons-free zones, test bans, and 
other non-proliferation treaties, virtually all of which are codified in mul-
tilateral instruments, further buttresses the proposition that there exists an 
obligation to pursue non-proliferation methods consistent with the exist-
ing regime’s practice under customary international law.88 Third, the le-
gitimacy of the regime is underscored when one examines the nuclear 
weapons control issue as a classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma 
(“PD”). In this game theory model, the players are confronted with a col-
lective action problem in which no player can be sure what course of ac-
tion the other players will take and unilateral defection from the collec-
tive purpose can produce the greatest individual benefits. Arms control 
presents precisely such a predicament.89 However, despite the strong pull 
of non-compliance in this context, 182 non-nuclear weapons states have 
signed the NPT and those with nuclear programs have submitted to full-
scope safeguards on all their nuclear energy facilities.90 This fact alone 
illustrates the degree of legitimacy the non-proliferation regime has at-
tained notwithstanding its aforementioned shortcomings. When states 
forgo short-term strategic advantages while paying deference to long-
term “communitarian interests,” it evinces a collective desire to see the 
regime’s rules reinforced.91 A corollary of this principle is that a defect-
ing state will be regarded a threat to the long-term interests of other 
states.92 
                                                                                                             
 87. United Nations, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 
2. 
 88. In furtherance of this goal, the decision of the International Court of Justice in the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons recognized the existence of an obliga-
tion of all states under customary international law to pursue disarmament in good faith. 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J 226, 
265–67 (Jul. 8). 
 89. Abbott, supra note 22, at 8. 
 90. See Communications Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guide-
lines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, supra note 33, at 
para. 4. 
 91. FRANCK, supra note 16, at 57. 
 92. Id. at 150–51. 
2008] U.S.-INDIA STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PARTNERSHIP 739 
A. The U.S.-India Deal Represents a Rejection of Multilateralism as an 
Effective Means to Further Non-Proliferation that Threatens the Re-
gime’s Legitimacy 
Although the purported interests of both India and the United States in 
entering this agreement are to further the goals of non-proliferation,93 the 
means they have undertaken stand in stark contrast to and are incoherent 
with the multilateral approach that is embraced by the remainder of the 
non-proliferation regime. Franck posits that a rule’s legitimacy depends, 
in part, on the coherence with which it is pursued by the states subscrib-
ing to its authority.94 Consequently, inconsistent application of a rule by 
states should be rationally distinguishable as exceptions that do not de-
tract from its overall coherence.95 Therefore, if one accepts the assertion 
that multilateral international agreements represent the customary ex-
pression of non-proliferation policies, a bilateral agreement with a non-
nuclear weapons state must conform to the custom at least to a degree 
that can be considered not incoherent with the regime’s rules. Alterna-
tively, some rational explanation should distinguish the agreement so as 
to maintain the coherence of the multilateral regime’s rule. This cannot 
be said of the partnership between the United States and India. 
To better understand the primacy of multilateralism in the non-
proliferation regime, it would be helpful to survey four landmark agree-
ments and, where applicable, discuss the conduct of the United States 
and India in each respective context: 
1. Latin American Treaty of Tlatelolco 96 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco established the first nuclear-weapons-free 
zone (“NWFZ”), which recognized that “militarily denuclearized zones 
are not an end in themselves but rather a means for achieving general and 
complete disarmament at a later stage . . . .”97 Under article 1 of the 
agreement, parties undertake to use nuclear material and facilities solely 
for peaceful purposes and are under an affirmative duty to prohibit and 
prevent the manufacture, production, acquisition, receipt, storage, instal-
lation, or deployment of such weapons, “directly or indirectly, by the 
parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.”98 
                                                                                                             
 93. See Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: United States and India: Strategic 
Partnership, supra note 30. 
 94. FRANCK, supra note 16, at 151. 
 95. Id. at 153. 
 96. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 14. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 523 (emphasis added). 
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This broadly stated obligation is indicative of the drafters’ intention to 
encourage not only multilateral accord on the issue of non-proliferation, 
but cooperative and collective efforts to prevent their development in any 
subject territory.99 Consistent with this vision, article 7 establishes an 
international organ known as the Agency for Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America that is comprised of representatives of the 
contracting parties.100 The General Conference is the Agency’s supreme 
decision-making organ and its decisions relating to procedural and sub-
stantive obligations under the agreement are binding on the contacting 
parties. Perhaps the most powerful expression of multilateralism displac-
ing state sovereignty is the “special inspections” provision under article 
16.101 It provides for either the IAEA to conduct an inspection in accor-
dance with safeguards agreements or for the Council (a body of five rep-
resentatives elected by the General Conference) to request a special in-
spection when there is reason to suspect some proscribed activity by or 
on behalf of a contracting party.102 
All thirty-three Latin American countries are parties to this treaty.103 In 
addition, as a signatory of the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty, the 
United States has agreed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 
against the contracting parties.104 Thus, the Tlatelolco Treaty undeniably 
expresses solidarity of the Latin American states in their adherence to 
non-proliferation. Coupled with the endorsement by the United States as 
                                                                                                             
 99. Such a purpose can be gleaned from clause 12 of the Preamble, which reads, 
“That the privileged situation of the signatory States, whose territories are wholly free 
from nuclear weapons, imposes upon them the inescapable duty of preserving that situa-
tion both in their own interests and for the good of mankind. . . .” Id. at 522. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 527. 
 102. Id. Article 24 of the Tlatelolco Treaty contains a compromise clause accepting the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the event of a dispute 
between the Parties. Id. at 530. 
 103. Adam Shapiro, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones- The Solution to Nuclear Disarma-
ment?, UN CHRONICLE ONLINE EDITION, http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2004/web 
Articles/081204_nwfz.asp (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 104. Understandably in light of the Cold War context in which this was signed, this 
promise is qualified by the caveat that, “the United States would have to consider an 
armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, 
would be incompatible with the Contracting Party’s corresponding obligations under 
Article I of the Treaty.” Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 
Its Status and the Status of Additional Protocols I and II, May 2, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1404, 
1420. See also Additional Protocol I, which imposes a duty on non-Latin American sig-
natory states to enforce the articles of the Treaty in territories under their de jure or de 
facto control that fall within the territorial scope of the treaty. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra 
note 14, 6 I.L.M. at 533. 
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a Protocol II signatory, this arrangement would tend to demonstrate the 
superior legal authority and influence a multilateral framework provides. 
2. The South Pacific Treaty of Rarotonga105 
In 1985, the thirteen independent states comprising the South Pacific 
Forum adopted an arguably more ambitious substantive approach in pro-
hibiting nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices in general.106 
Unlike the Tlatelolco Treaty, which makes an allowance for peaceful 
nuclear explosions under article 18, Rarotonga expressly renounces nu-
clear explosions of any kind in several places throughout the treaty.107 
With respect to decision-making authority, under annex 3 the Rarotonga 
establishes the Consultative Committee, which is the Tlatelolco Coun-
cil’s counterpart. It is charged with reviewing complaints by parties and 
where necessary appointing “suitably qualified inspectors” who will re-
port on any alleged breaches, triggering a consultative meeting of the 
contracting parties.108 Finally, the Rarotonga is furnished with Additional 
Protocol II, which invites the five NWSs to undertake not to use or 
threaten to use any nuclear explosive device against parties to the 
treaty.109 As of June 20, 2002 all the invitees except the United States 
had ratified this Protocol.110 
The differential treatment afforded the Rarotonga NWFZ as opposed to 
the Tlatelolco is indicative of the realist policy approach Washington 
employs in the realm of nuclear non-proliferation. By ratifying the “non-
use” protocol for Latin America with the Cold War as a backdrop, the 
United States was subsuming the American continents under its nuclear 
umbrella and avoiding their co-option by the former Soviet Union. This 
same treatment is denied to the South Pacific NWFZ despite its adher-
ence to even higher legal standards of nuclear abstinence and despite the 
remaining four nuclear powers assuring “non-use” through ratification. 
                                                                                                             
 105. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 14. 
 106. The thirteen contracting states: Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu. Adam Shapiro, supra note 103. 
 107. See Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 14, 24 I.L.M. at 1444 (art. 1(c) reads: “‘nu-
clear explosive device’ means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of 
releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose. . . .”) (emphasis added). Also of 
interest are article 3 (Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices), article 5 (Prevention 
of Stationing of Nuclear Explosive Devices), and article 6 (Prevention of Testing Nuclear 
Explosive Devices). Id. at 1444–46. 
 108. Id. at 1456. 
 109. Id. at 1461. 
 110. Status of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, http://www.opanal.org/ 
NWFZ/Rarotonga/rarotonga.htm (on file with author). 
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In this case, the U.S. approach is an inconsistent recognition of the value 
of NWFZ to the non-proliferation regime and detracts from the coher-
ence of the underlying principles informing such instruments.111 This 
ultimately undermines the compliance-pull of NWFZ from the perspec-
tive of other NWSs. 
3. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (“ABMT”)112 
The ABMT was a bilateral mutual assurance agreement between the 
former Soviet Union and the United States that sought to restrain the de-
fensive arms race between the two nations with the ultimate intended 
effect of stymieing the strategic offensive arms race.113 Under the treaty, 
each party undertakes to limit its development and deployment of anti-
ballistic missile (“ABM”) systems and promises to refrain from deploy-
ing such systems in the air, sea, space, or through mobile land-based 
technology.114 Article III allows for an exception whereby each country 
can employ ABM systems covering two limited areas, the capital and 
another 150 kilometer radius of its choosing.115 The treaty’s design is 
indicative of the unique bipolar paradigm that was the Cold War and 
therefore should not be criticized for its lack of multilateralism.116 What 
is material to this discussion, however, is the reactionary nature of U.S 
non-proliferation policy, which tends to write-off extant legal obligations 
for the sake of short-term offensive strategic advantages. 
On December 13, 2001, three months after the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the Bush administration executed what it had been 
planning well before the attacks: citing the emergent security context 
                                                                                                             
 111. FRANCK, supra note 16, at 174. 
 112. ABMT, supra note 12. 
 113. Id. See also Hillary A. Smith, Is Honesty Still the Best Policy: Considering Legal 
Options for Missile Defense and the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 199, 202 (2002) (discussing the underlying principle of Mutually Assured Destruction 
(“MAD”) as the cornerstone of the ABM treaty; explaining that a missile-defense system 
would remove the nuclear-stalemate, enabling one party to counter a retaliatory counter-
attack, thereby reviving an incentive to develop more destructive offensive weapons). 
 114. ABMT, supra note 12, at 3439, 3441. 
 115. In 1976, the Treaty was amended by a Protocol, which further restricted the num-
ber of zones each Party could protect with ABM systems, required that each country 
choose either to protect its capital or the alternative region provided for under article III, 
and dismantle the alternate with notice to the other Party. Limitation of Anti-ballistic 
Missile Systems, Protocol to the Treaty of May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 3, 1974, 27 
U.S.T. 1645. 
 116. Richard L. Williamson, Hard Law, Softlaw, And Non-Law In Multilateral Arms 
Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 64–65 (2003) (positing that 
“[b]ilateral nuclear arms control is virtually synonymous with the unique case of arms 
control between the US and the Soviet Union” given the high probability of MAD). 
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involving “terrorists” and “rogue states”, it unilaterally announced the 
irrelevance of the ABMT and withdrew from the instrument.117 In light 
of this changed circumstance, the United States argued, Russia was no 
longer its primary national security concern and therefore, its obligations 
owed to Russia under the ABMT were without purpose.118 Needless to 
say, Russia was strongly opposed to this position and emphasized the 
vital role the ABMT plays in the larger non-proliferation regime.119 
While relations between the two states have significantly improved from 
the constant state of enmity that prevailed before the dissolution of the 
U.S.S.R., beginning in 2001 with the U.S. withdrawal from the ABMT, 
there are indications that U.S. policy has emboldened Russia to increase 
its potency, albeit selectively, as a nuclear power.120 
Though the only parties to the treaty were the United States and Rus-
sia, the broader community of states considered the withdrawal as a sig-
nificant threat to international security.121 Not the least of these con-
cerned states was China, given that a United States equipped with an ef-
fective missile defense system would nullify the nuclear deterrent value 
of its own arsenal, thereby, perhaps justifiably, provoking it to abandon 
                                                                                                             
 117. John R. Burroughs, Jonathan Granoff, John H. Harrington, Bonnie D. Jenkins, 
Barry Kellman & Mark S. Zaid, Arms Control and National Security, 36 INT’L LAW 471, 
497 (2001) (citing U.S. Dep’t of State, President Discusses National Missile Defense, 
Remarks by George W. Bush, President, The Rose Garden, Washington D.C. (Dec. 13, 
2001)). See also First Committee, Closer to a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, UN 
CHRONICLE ONLINE EDITION, ¶¶ 10–11, http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2000/issue4/ 
0400p32.htm (citing arguments made by U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Robert Gray at the 
NPT Review Conference in April 2000) (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 118. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117. 
 119. Id. at 499 (citing ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Russian Statements on U.S. Mis-
sile Defense Plans, Oct. 2001, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/russianmd.asp). 
 120. See Christine Kucia, Russia Mulls Altered Nuclear Doctrine, ARMS CONTROL 
ASSOCIATION, Nov. 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_11/Russiannuclear 
doctrine.asp (discussing Russia’s announcement of its intention to “rejuvenate[]” its land 
based nuclear-weapons arsenal in order to secure a satisfactory deterrent level for thirty 
years). Despite this apparent push towards nuclear weapons development, Russia and the 
United States signed another bilateral measure in 2002. The Strategic Offensive Reduc-
tions Treaty (“SORT”), or “Moscow Treaty,” provided that each country would, “cut 
their deployed strategic nuclear forces to 1,700-2,200 warheads each—approximately a 
two-thirds reduction from current levels.” Philipp C. Bleek, U.S., Russia Sign Treaty 
Cutting Deployed Nuclear Forces, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, June 2002, http://www. 
armscontrol.org/act/2002_06/sortjune02.asp. See also The Strategic Offensive Reduc-
tions Treaty, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 24, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 799. 
 121. Burroughs, supra note 117, at 499 (citing the Final Document of the 2000 NPT 
Review Conference where NPT states view the ABMT as being “a cornerstone of strate-
gic stability and a basis for further reductions of strategic weapons). 
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its own commitments under the NPT.122 Here again, one witnesses the 
myopic realist calculations of the Pentagon and the White House defin-
ing non-proliferation policies and having the ultimate effect of eroding 
international faith in the control regimes. 
4. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (“CTBT”)123 
President Clinton lauded the CTBT as an essential and pivotal step to-
wards realizing global non-proliferation and disarmament.124 Because 
testing of nuclear technology is a necessary procedure in the sound de-
velopment of nuclear weapons systems, a complete ban on testing would 
effectively halt significant advances in arms development.125 Under its 
basic obligations, the CTBT requires parties to refrain from conducting 
or participating in any nuclear explosive tests and to adopt domestic laws 
prohibiting the same.126 The CTBT opened for signature on September 
24, 1996.127 President Clinton was the first head of state to sign the 
Treaty.128 On October 13, 1999, the Senate declined to give its advice 
and consent to the CTBT,129 making it the first arms control treaty to be 
rejected by the Senate in eighty years.130 As of September 2007, 177 
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. See also Paul Kerr, China Stresses Common Approach With Bush Administra-
tion’s Non-proliferation Policy, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Jan./Feb. 2004, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_01-02/China.asp (discussing the shift in tone of 
Beijing’s policy on nuclear non-proliferation released in a white paper expressing criti-
cism against the U.S. pursuit of a missile defense system, leaving unaddressed goals of 
disarmament, and stressing multilateral, peaceful measures for achieving non-
proliferation goals). 
 123. CTBT, supra note 13. 
 124. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 490 (citing Press Release, White House, 
Remarks by the President to the 52nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
(Sept. 22, 1997)). 
 125. Sarah Elizabeth Kreps and Anthony Clark Arend, Why States Follow the Rules: 
Toward a Positional Theory of Adherence to International Regimes, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 331, 355 (Spring 2006). See also Masahiko Asada, CTBT: Legal Questions Aris-
ing from Its Non-Entry-Into-Force, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 85, 88 (2002). 
 126. CTBT, supra note 13, at 1444. 
 127. The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers, 
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Apr. 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ctbtsig. 
asp. 
 128. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 489. 
 129. The defeat was brought about by a vote of fifty-one to forty-eight. Id. 
 130. Id. See also Craig Cerniello, Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: 
Clinton Vows to Continue Moratorium, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Sept./Oct. 1999, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09-10/ctbso99.asp. In the wake of the Senate’s 
rejection of the CTBT, the Clinton administration not only vowed to observe its morato-
rium on testing but seemed to allude to this course of action as one arising out of a sense 
of legal obligation as a signatory to the CTBT. See Asada, supra note 125 at 96 (citing 
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countries had signed the treaty and 140 countries had ratified.131 The 
CTBT will come into force only when forty-four countries designated as 
“nuclear capable” have signed and ratified the treaty.132 Of those coun-
tries, thirty-four have ratified but India, Pakistan, and North Korea, also 
required states, have not signed.133 
The strict entry-into-force clause of the CTBT indicates the absolute 
necessity for “nuclear-capable” states to be bound by such an instrument 
in order to ensure a stable legal foundation for non-proliferation.134 An-
other factor, which may explain the stringent entry-into-force require-
ment, is the CTBT’s robust verification regime, which includes an inter-
national monitoring system (“IMS”) and allows for on-site inspections 
(“OSI”).135 The IMS envisions monitoring facilities placed in approxi-
mately ninety countries throughout the world that are administered and 
operated by a host country in collaboration with the CTBT Organization 
(“CTBTO”) to monitor signals underground, underwater, and above-
ground.136 The OSI provision contains a liberal procedure by which a 
state party suspicious of a nuclear test may request an on-site inspection 
based on information gathered by either the IMS and/or “any relevant 
technical information obtained by national technical means of verifica-
tion in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of inter-
national law . . . .”137 Furthermore, there is no exhaustion requirement 
obliging the complaining state to pursue consultation or clarification with 
the party under suspicion.138 
Given the lofty ambitions of this instrument, it would behoove the 
United States, as the world’s most prominent advocate of non-
proliferation, to ensure the survival and success of the CTBT. In the 
                                                                                                             
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s statement professing U.S. intentions to abide by 
its obligations, “as a signatory under international law,” in The Imperial Presidency, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999). 
 131. The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, supra note 127. 
 132. Id. (listing the necessary ratifications). 
 133. Id. 
 134. In fact, as Asada pointedly remarks, “the CTBT is redundant for the non-nuclear-
weapon states party to the NPT, which have already been prohibited from possessing 
nuclear weapons in the first place, let alone conducting testing on them.” Asada, supra 
note 125, at 87. 
 135. CTBT, supra note 13, at 1458. 
 136. In contrast, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 “only prohibited nuclear test ex-
plosions in the atmosphere, outer space and under water” and relied solely upon national 
technical means of verification administered unilaterally. Asada, supra note 125, at 89–
90. 
 137. CTBT, supra note 13, 1449. 
 138. Asada, supra note 125, at 91. 
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wake of the Senate’s rejection of the treaty in 1999, one could at least 
argue that the Clinton administration’s assurances to remain loyal to the 
spirit of the CTBT demonstrated good faith in accordance with article VI 
of the NPT.139 In addition, Asada argues that mere signatories to a treaty 
may derive a legal obligation from customary international law to refrain 
from acts that would defeat the purpose of the instrument.140 In this vein, 
the United States, under the direction of the Bush administration has 
thrown the viability of the CTBT into serious question whilst ignoring its 
obligations under international law. 
Contemplating the difficulties that would inhere in attaining full-
fledged legal enforcement of the treaty, the drafters of the CTBT pro-
vided for intermittent conferences under article XIV.141 This provision 
allows a majority of ratifying states to call a conference in order to con-
sider measures that could further progress towards entry-into-force.142 A 
majority of ratifying states called such a conference in November of 
2001.143 Although the conference is convened by ratifying states, under 
paragraph 4 of article XIV, signatories are invited to attend as observ-
ers.144 The United States declined to attend the conference at the United 
Nations, sending ripples of disappointment throughout the international 
community.145 This reaffirmed the Bush administration’s previous decla-
rations that it would not resubmit the CTBT to the Senate for ratifica-
tion.146 In contrast, China, also a non-ratifying signatory, attended the 
                                                                                                             
 139. Article VI of the NPT reads, “Each of the Parties undertakes to pursue negotia-
tions in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at 
an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete dis-
armament under strict and effective international control.” NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. 
at 492, 729 U.N.T.S. at 170. 
 140. Asada, supra note 125, at 98. 
 141. CTBT, supra note 13, at 1457. 
 142. Id. The first conference was held in Vienna from October 6–8, 1999 in accor-
dance with paragraph 2 of Article XIV calling for the first conference three years after 
the adoption of the treaty in the case it had not entered into force. Burroughs, et. al., su-
pra note 117, at 491. 
 143. Philipp C. Bleek, UN Conference Shows Support For Test Ban; U.S. Absent, 
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Dec. 2001, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/ 
ctbtdec01.asp. 
 144. CTBT, supra note 13, 35 I.L.M. at 1457. 
 145. So overt was the recalcitrance of the United States that U.S. Ambassador to the 
U.N. John Negroponte, was quoted as saying, “We’re just not going to engage.” Bleek, 
supra note 143, ¶ 4. See Daryl G. Kimball, CTBT Rogue State?, ARMS CONTROL 
ASSOCIATION, Dec. 2001, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/ctbtanalysisdec01.asp 
(describing, in detail, the unilateralist pattern of the Bush administration in dealing with 
non-proliferation and the reactions by concerned states). 
 146. Bleek, supra note 143. See also Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 492. 
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2001 conference, once again demonstrating the conspicuous reluctance 
of the United States to embrace multilateralism.147 Moreover, the U.S. 
failure to support this conference and its refusal to resume ratification 
procedures domestically can be viewed as breaches of its duty to negoti-
ate in good faith under article VI of the NPT and its duty to avoid acts 
that defeat the purpose of the treaty under customary international law.148 
Finally, the United States compounds the inconsistencies in its non-
proliferation record by partially funding the CTBT Preparatory Commis-
sion.149 The CTBT provides for a preparatory commission (“PrepCom”) 
that envisions that the aforementioned IMS and OSI programs will be 
functional upon the entry-into-force of the CTBT.150 In March of 2002, 
in its proposed budget for the 2003 fiscal year, the Bush administration 
requested from Congress funding in the amount of $18.2 million to sup-
port the development of the IMS only.151 This selective endorsement of 
one aspect of the CTBT, while arguably an overture consistent with the 
goals of non-proliferation, has been received by many states with uneasi-
ness given the conflicting interest of the Bush administration in pursuing 
low-yield nuclear weapons.152 On balance, in light of Thomas Franck’s 
theory of legitimacy as a function of coherence, the inconsistency of U.S. 
policy vis-à-vis the CTBT cultivates an atmosphere of unpredictability. 
This in turn will inevitably discourage other key states (a state most per-
tinent to our discussion, India), whose ratification is required for entry-
into-force, to abstain from ratification and threaten the very survival of 
the treaty itself. 
India’s treatment of the CTBT has been consistent with its historical 
blend of principled criticism of and willingness to engage with the non-
proliferation regime. India’s criticism of the CTBT came primarily dur-
ing the negotiations over its text in the 1996 Conference on Disarmament 
(“CD”) in Geneva, where it vetoed the full text of the CTBT.153 Later, a 
                                                                                                             
 147. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 491. 
 148. The latter argument would follow given that the failure of the United States to 
ratify would preclude the entry into force of the CTBT, thereby relieving all ratifying 
states from the basic textual duty to abstain from testing. 
 149. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 116, at 492. 
 150. Asada, supra note 125, at 104. 
 151. News Briefs, Bush Requests Funds for CTBT Monitoring, ARMS CONTROL 
ASSOCIATION, Mar. 2002, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/briefsmarch02.asp# 
ctbt. 
 152. Burroughs, et. al., supra note 117, at 491. The uneasiness is justified if one con-
siders the amount of leverage the United States will have over the international monitor-
ing system by funding it, all the while remaining a party not bound by the treaty’s obliga-
tions. 
 153. Asada, supra note 125, at 86. 
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U.N. General Assembly Resolution adopted the text and opened it for 
signature despite dissenting votes from India, Libya, and Bhutan.154 
Given India’s nuclear tests, which would follow in 1998, India’s resis-
tance to the CTBT’s adoption is readily explained.155 After its successful 
tests, however, facing sanctions by the United States, India voiced its 
willingness to sign the CTBT in exchange for a lifting of sanctions and 
unilaterally declared a moratorium on testing.156 To date, India has not 
signed the CTBT, most likely taking its cue from the United States’ fail-
ure to ratify the same. Therefore, the U.S.-India agreement as it stands 
would allow India to escape commitments it made after its nuclear tests. 
Because by the terms of the agreement all that is required of India is that 
it maintain its moratorium on testing, the deal overlooks India’s addi-
tional responsibility of signing the CTBT pursuant to its assurances fol-
lowing the 1998 tests. 
The foregoing discussion has attempted to demonstrate the primacy of 
multilateralism as a followed custom in the realm of non-proliferation 
and the inconsistency with which the United States has pursued its poli-
cies on the same. The United States often sacrifices legal coherence for 
the sake of perceived strategic advantages. The U.S.-India Strategic Part-
nership is another manifestation of this behavior that will undoubtedly 
detract from the non-proliferation regime’s coherence and consequently, 
its legitimacy. Alternatively, the partnership can have the effect of bring-
ing into question the legally permissible conduct of a NWS with respect 
to a state that is not a party to any nuclear arms control instrument. In 
Franck’s words, the agreement can undermine the regime’s determinacy 
by clouding the scope of acceptable behavior, thereby raising the specter 
of other nuclear capable countries trading freely in nuclear technology 
with unbound states.157 
                                                                                                             
 154. Steve Andreasen, Book Review: Treaty and Tragedy—The Comprehensive Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider’s Perspective by Keith A. Hansen, ARMS CONTROL 
ASSOCIATION, May 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_05/bookreview.asp. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Howard Diamond, India, Pakistan Commit to Sign CTB Treaty by September 
1999, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, Oct. 1998, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_10 
/ipoc98.asp (citing statements made by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at the 
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 157. FRANCK, supra note 16. 
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B. The U.S.-India Deal Threatens the Non-Proliferation Regime’s De-
terminacy thereby Inducing State Behavior Injurious to the Regime’s 
Goals 
According to Franck, a rule’s compliance pull is largely dependent on 
its determinacy or elasticity.158 The more a rule is susceptible to several 
conflicting interpretations, the easier it becomes to justify non-
compliance.159 This also may be an indication that the drafters and archi-
tects of the rule themselves were at odds on what kinds of behavior they 
were setting out to cultivate.160 The NPT certainly exhibits such elasticity 
and one may intuit that its drafters deliberately sought to preserve flexi-
bility for the future.161 However, as discussed in Part II.A above, the 
broader non-proliferation regime has evolved since the adoption of the 
NPT in favor of oversight and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes through multilateral institutions. This Part will argue that 1) the 
justifications being proffered by the United States in support of its nu-
clear partnership with India stand in direct opposition to the regime’s 
expected patterns of behavior and 2) if these justifications are accepted 
and endorsed by the several states comprising the regime, what little pro-
gress has been made towards crystallization of a more determinate rule 
of non-proliferation will be squandered away. 
In order to understand the irony of the U.S. proposed nuclear partner-
ship with India, it is important to recall that the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(“NSG”) must, by consensus, approve the deal, thereby excepting India 
from its policy requiring recipient states 1) to be parties to the NPT and 
2) to apply full-scope IAEA safeguards, i.e., oversight on all their peace-
ful nuclear activities.162 Because India already has military nuclear facili-
ties and will essentially choose those that it designates as “civil,” the 
comprehensive scope intended by IAEA’s language is thwarted. The 
NSG was created following India’s “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 
when it became apparent that nuclear materials transferred for peaceful 
                                                                                                             
 158. Id. at 54. 
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related technology and article IV, which encourages transfer of nuclear technology for 
“peaceful purposes.” NPT, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 488–89, 492, 729 U.N.T.S. at 166–
67, 170. 
 162. Communications Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for 
the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, supra note 33; See also 
IAEA, The Nuclear Suppliers Group: Its Origins, Role and Activities, INFCIRC/539/ 
Rev.3 at 5, May 30, 2005 [hereinafter NSG Origins]. 
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purposes could be invidiously diverted for use in weapons production.163 
Currently, the NSG consortium is comprised of forty-five states that rep-
resent the nuclear suppliers of the world.164 In 1978, the NSG published 
guidelines that incorporated a “Trigger List” of items that would trigger 
the requirement for full-scope IAEA safeguards as a precondition for 
transfer to a non-NWS of materials that could directly contribute to 
weapons production.165 Shortly after 1990, Iraq presented a new dilemma 
to NSG through its clandestine weapons program. Iraq sought to procure 
lower-level dual-use items not covered by the guidelines and then, “to 
build its own Trigger-List materials.”166 This prompted the NSG to adopt 
separate dual-use guidelines in 1992 that generally prohibit the transfer 
of certain agreed upon dual-use items when there is an “unacceptable 
risk of diversion to such an activity, or when the transfers are contrary to 
the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”167 
In light of this obvious movement towards thorough risk assessment of 
nuclear weapons proliferation by the world’s major multilateral organ 
representing nuclear suppliers, the U.S.-India nuclear partnership would 
cast the legitimacy and integrity of the institution into serious doubt 
should the NSG approve the arrangement. Throughout its history, the 
NSG has sought to balance accessibility to nuclear technology with the 
interests of achieving full-scope safeguards on any recipient country’s 
fuel-cycle.168 As it stands now, the envisioned U.S. agreement with India 
would not require it to bring all its nuclear facilities under the auspices of 
                                                                                                             
 163. See Milhollin, supra note 69. See also Communications Received from Certain 
Member States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and 
Technology, supra note 33, at 5. 
 164. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rus-
sian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States. NSG Origins, supra note 162, at 14.  
 165. Id. at 5. 
 166. Id. at 6. 
 167. International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications Received from Certain 
Member States Regarding Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equip-
ment, Materials, Software and Related Technology, INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, Mar. 20, 
2006, at 4. Dual-use technology is generally defined as a broad array technology that can 
be employed in military uses as well as nonviolent civil applications (e.g., software, 
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Dual-Use Technology in a Post-9/11 World, 18 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 431, 432 (2005). 
 168. NSG Origins, supra note 162, at 6. 
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the IAEA.169 Nevertheless, the Bush administration has adamantly de-
fended the partnership with India as consistent with the principles of 
non-proliferation and maintains that, if anything, the partnership will en-
hance the non-proliferation regime by bringing two-thirds of India’s ci-
vilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.170 In her address to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 5, 2006, Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice responded to concerns that India has yet to sign the 
NPT: 
We have to recognize that the NPT is the cornerstone, but one part of a 
maturing non-proliferation framework in which we are also working to 
have rules of the game that the Nuclear Suppliers Group has on certain 
standards of behavior. India is agreeing to adhere to those unilater-
ally.171 
This statement is absolutely misleading since India has not agreed to 
the standards of behavior promulgated by the NSG and in fact, the NSG 
must exempt it from the heretofore essential precondition of FSS. More-
over, according to one representative for the Department of State who 
specializes in Indian affairs, Katherine Schultz, it is highly improbable 
that India will ever agree to full-scope safeguards.172 Even the limited 
partial-safeguard pledge that India made as part of the agreement has 
proven to be less than forthcoming.173 Understandably then, following a 
confidential presentation by Indian officials on October 12, 2006 in front 
                                                                                                             
 169. Bernard Gwertzman, Interview with Lawrence Scheinman: New U.S.-India 
Agreement Undercuts U.S. Allegiance to Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
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 172. Schultz Interview, supra note 30. 
 173. “New Delhi has repeatedly stated that Washington must change U.S. law before 
India takes steps to fulfill its side of the deal.” Wade Boese, Senate Vote on U.S.-Indian 
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until the IAEA safeguards are in place.” Shelby, supra note 170. 
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of the NSG, two NSG member officials expressed skepticism as to the 
reliability of India’s assurances.174 
All this uncertainty surrounding the U.S.-India proposal raises the 
question: why force such a sweeping exception through a fragile control 
system that is just recently becoming enmeshed in international law? One 
obvious albeit simplistic response is money. The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce has estimated that the deal can generate $100 billion in en-
ergy sales for U.S. companies.175 Ron Somers, President of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce’s U.S.-India Business Council, fears that if the 
United States does not feed India’s growing demand for nuclear energy, 
competitors such as France, Canada, and Germany will capture that mar-
ket, resulting in major losses for U.S. companies.176 This economic rea-
soning, however, fails to take into account the fate of the legal regime 
governing transfer of nuclear technology. Recalling Franck’s theory of 
determinacy, it can reasonably be said that the NSG’s categorical re-
quirement of full-scope safeguards is a clear rule outlining behavior ex-
pected of states. It should follow that states are less willing to ignore this 
rule for the sake of short term instant gratification in the interest of pur-
suing long-term communitarian goals.177 Therefore, if the NSG itself ap-
proves the exception for India and allows the U.S.-India deal to go 
through, it would implicitly endorse the troubling behavior of pursuing 
economic gains at the expense of ensuring non-proliferation. Even now, 
while NSG’s stamp of approval is pending, the moral hazard that the deal 
presents to the rest of the nuclear-capable states is palpable. China, for its 
part, has already “grandfathered” certain technology transfer agreements 
it made with Pakistan.178 Scheinman’s fear is that other countries will 
                                                                                                             
 174. Wade Boese, Nuclear Suppliers Updated on U.S.-Indian Deal, ARMS CONTROL 
ASSOCIATION, Nov. 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/NucSuppliers.asp. 
 175. Mathewson, supra note 29. 
 176. The U.S.-India Business Council represents companies such as General Electric 
Co. and Westinghouse Electric Co., which are ready to supply India with nuclear equip-
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 177. FRANCK, supra note 16, at 57. 
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entists, Pakistan Nuclear Weapons: A Brief History of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program, 
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also see Pakistan (not to mention other similarly situated states such as 
Israel) as a lucrative business opportunity and transfer sensitive tech-
nologies to it without ensuring comprehensive safeguards.179 This fear is 
not unfounded as it has become clear that Russia, Britain, France, and 
Australia have all spoken out in favor of this agreement.180 
In conclusion, should the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement reach 
fruition with the blessing of the NSG, it would undermine the determi-
nacy of the non-proliferation regime thereby inducing widespread non-
compliance. This result will naturally follow since the agreement creates 
a moral hazard for other states to pursue similar arrangements with the 
aim of realizing short term monetary gains while forgoing long-term col-
lective goals of non-proliferation that have heretofore been of primary 
importance to the NSG and the international community at large. 
III. THE U.S.-INDIA PARTNERSHIP THREATENS AN UNSTABLE PEACE 
It is beyond the scope of this Note to provide a detailed outline of the 
events giving rise to the historical animosity between India and Paki-
stan.181 The purpose of this Part is simply to frame the U.S.-India nuclear 
partnership within the seemingly intractable discord between India and 
                                                                                                             
 179. Gwertzman, supra note 169 (In her interview, Scheinman elaborates, “to the ex-
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 180. Statement of R. Nicholas Burns, Under Sec’y of State for Political Affairs, U.S.-
India Civil Nuclear Agreement: Foreign Press Center Briefing, March 22, 2006, 
http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/63542.htm. 
 181. Beginning with the partition of the sub-continent in 1947, India and Pakistan have 
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1971 when a civil war in East Pakistan provoked India to support the East Pakistani re-
bels against the armies of West Pakistan. Shortly after India’s intervention, East Pakistan 
became an independent state now known as Bangladesh. Subsequently, frequent armed 
disturbances erupted in Kashmir, provoking India to blame Pakistan for staging a pro-
tracted proxy war on its territory. After the 1998 nuclear tests of India and then Pakistan, 
1999 saw another armed conflict erupt when India launched an armed attack against 
Pakistani-backed forces that had infiltrated Kashmir. A massive troop build-up along the 
border threatened the onset of a full-scale war. Most recently, a similar situation was 
precipitated when Islamic militants attacked the Indian Parliament in 2001. See India-
Pakistan: Troubled Relations, supra note 18. 
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Pakistan and to once again emphasize the importance of legal regimes in 
cultivating transparency, compliance, and predictable behavior. It will be 
argued that the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm, in which collective action 
is often improbable given the strong incentive to cheat for individual 
gains, is all the more true in the case of India and Pakistan, given their 
acrimonious past.182 Second, because there is no binding regional pact 
that obliges the states to abstain from nuclear weapons proliferation and 
because no agreement subjects Pakistan’s nuclear facilities to IAEA 
safeguards, history counsels that the most probable outcome is increased 
proliferation by Pakistan. Therefore, absent a broader arrangement that 
brings Pakistan’s facilities under safeguards, the U.S.-India deal will 
more than likely have the unintended effect of accelerating proliferation 
in the region. 
The standard prisoner’s dilemma model envisions players who must 
decide only one move, where the choice is between a collective scenario 
promising a desirable outcome for all, a selfish scenario where cheating 
while others cooperate maximizes individual gain, and a worst-case sce-
nario where everyone cheats and the group suffers a substantial joint 
penalty.183 In this setting, the theory proposes that each player has two 
logically distinct incentives to defect, i.e., cheat.184 On the one hand, 
there is an “offensive incentive” to defect because a player can realize 
the best individual outcome while the other cooperates. Conversely, there 
is a “defensive incentive” to defect in order for a player to avoid being on 
the receiving end of an offensive defection, i.e., to avoid the “sucker’s 
payoff” by unilateral cooperation.185 
Before proceeding with this line of analysis, it is necessary to establish 
what legal regime India and Pakistan would be complying with or defect-
ing from. The simple truth of the matter is that neither state is a party to 
any international arms agreement circumscribing its right to expand its 
nuclear arsenal. The only relevant treaty binding both parties that argua-
bly limits their ability to proliferate in one narrow respect is the 1963 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space, and Under Water.186 Popularly known as the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty (“LTBT”), the agreement prohibits states from conducting nuclear 
test explosions in the atmosphere, outer-space or underwater, including 
                                                                                                             
 182. Abbott, supra note 22, at 16. 
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 184. Id. at 8. 
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 186. Billy Merck, International Law and the Nuclear Threat in Kashmir: A Proposal 
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territorial waters or high seas.187 This treaty did not in any way inhibit 
either country from conducting underground nuclear tests in 1998. Since 
those tests, however, both India and Pakistan have declared unilateral 
moratoriums on nuclear tests that can potentially be regarded as conduct 
arising out of a legal obligation.188 Both states assumed this policy stance 
in the wake of their 1998 nuclear tests, which had provoked the United 
States to impose sanctions.189 The sanctions were promptly waived just 
six months after the tests when the leaders of India and Pakistan ex-
pressed a commitment to the entry-into-force of the CTBT and adherence 
to their moratorium pledges.190 While India went as far as acknowledging 
the possibility of a legal obligation prohibiting further tests, Pakistan 
cited the pendency of the CTBT and pledged to refrain from tests, 
“unless another extraordinary event” proved inimical to its security inter-
ests.191 The last possible source of legal obligation restricting the conduct 
of both states is the Lahore Declaration and Memorandum of Under-
standing (“MOU”), signed on February 21, 1999.192 These instruments 
commit both states to abide by their unilateral testing moratoriums, com-
pel both states to engage in confidence building measures, and require 
them to adopt national policies that reduce the risks of a nuclear ex-
change.193 
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Provided with this very tenuous legal framework, it is clear that the 
U.S.-India deal serves to exacerbate both the offensive incentive for In-
dia to defect as well as the defensive incentive for Pakistan to defect.194 
On the one hand, India would now enjoy liberalized trade in nuclear ma-
terial and be tempted to gain a marked advantage over the Pakistani nu-
clear arsenal, thereby defusing Pakistan’s deterrence value.195 This is es-
pecially likely in the case of India if one subscribes to Abbott’s assertion 
that “offensive defection is largely a problem of inadequate informa-
tion.”196 Since India will not be subject to full-scope safeguards on its 
nuclear facilities, one can presume inadequate information. Therefore, 
the need for a more robust verification scheme at least between Pakistan 
and India should be a primary objective for the United States if it 
chooses to proceed with the nuclear partnership with India. 
On the other hand, faced with a history of India’s aggressive behavior 
in nuclear proliferation, Pakistan would fear the “sucker’s payoff” and 
would be induced to expand its nuclear arsenal.197 If the immediate dip-
lomatic reaction of a state is any indication of how it will conduct itself 
in the not-too-distant future, then it is not insignificant that Pakistan can-
celled the diplomatic visit of its Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, to the 
United States after the announcement of the India-U.S. nuclear partner-
ship.198 Moreover, Pakistan’s primary concern is in fact what the pris-
oner’s dilemma envisions as outlined above, i.e., the lack of adequate 
information and the need for verification. Pakistan is primarily concerned 
with the possibility that India can now produce increased quantities of 
weapons-grade material in its unsafeguarded facilities.199 The National 
Command Authority, Pakistan’s nuclear authority, ominously declared, 
“In view of the fact that the agreement would enable India to produce 
significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un-
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safeguarded nuclear reactors, the NCA expressed firm resolve that our 
credible minimum deterrence requirements would be met[] . . . .”200 
Ignoring these very clear signals emanating from Pakistan, the United 
States is emphasizing the benefit of having India’s civil nuclear facilities 
(the ones it designates as civil) under IAEA safeguards. Responding to a 
question that raised the issue of Pakistan’s security concerns, Under Sec-
retary of Political Affairs Nicholas Burns was quoted as saying, 
this arrangement between the United States and India is good for all of 
the countries of South Asia, including Pakistan, because India’s nuclear 
program, civil nuclear program, which has been outside of international 
supervision, outside of international safeguards for 30 years, is now go-
ing to come into international safeguards and the IAEA is going to 
place safeguards on fully three-quarters of India’s program. That ought 
to be, you would think, an attractive proposition to all the neighbors of 
India, including Pakistan.201 
However, as the discussion in Part II demonstrated, increasing the ac-
cessibility of nuclear materials to India in its civilian programs necessar-
ily frees up nuclear fuel already within its possession for military pur-
poses and Pakistan is keenly aware of this.202 Therefore, India’s promises 
amount to mere assurances, which, if relied on by the United States, can 
increase the likelihood of offensive defection.203 
In conclusion, India’s history of mutual enmity and suspicion with 
Pakistan, which to this day remains unresolved largely due to the strug-
gling peace process over Kashmir, makes the U.S.-India nuclear partner-
ship a lightening rod for conflict under the present circumstances. Sec-
ond, the dearth of legal regimes governing the conduct of either India or 
Pakistan in the nuclear weapons realm make the proposition of liberaliz-
ing nuclear trade with India highly risky. This is especially the case when 
Pakistan’s unilateral moratorium on testing was predicated on the condi-
tion that the CTBT entered into force and nothing transpired that would 
prove deleterious to its security interests.204 Because the CTBT’s future 
is seriously in question after the United States shifted its policy with re-
spect to that instrument, Pakistan’s right to remedy any regional imbal-
ance of power it perceives is legally unfettered. The probability that 
Pakistan will pursue this course of action is high given its record of as-
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piring to match India in military might as well as the principles govern-
ing the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has set out the legal landscape that the U.S.-India nuclear 
partnership confronts. Part I began by explicating the inherent weakness 
of the IAEA safeguards system with its allowances for military exemp-
tions and inability to prevent risky transfers before the materials are de-
livered. This weakness was juxtaposed with India’s historical stance to-
wards non-proliferation and its proclivity to subvert the goals of non-
proliferation by feigning cooperation in order to win concessions from 
nuclear suppliers, particularly the United States, and ultimately diverting 
those concessions to non-peaceful uses. There has been no significant 
indication, in legal stance or otherwise, that India will change this behav-
ior. 
Part II examined the U.S.-India nuclear partnership in the context of 
the broader non-proliferation regime and Franck’s theory of regime le-
gitimacy. It argued that, as a matter of customary international law, states 
pursue non-proliferation objectives through multilateral channels or 
means not inconsistent with multilateral obligations. Because India is not 
a party to any multilateral treaty proscribing its right to expand its nu-
clear arsenal, the U.S.-India nuclear partnership threatens to undermine 
the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime in two ways: 1) as a major 
bilateral measure by the United States that is inconsistent with the goals 
of non-proliferation, it detracts from the regime’s coherence and 2) if the 
relevant multilateral bodies, such as the NSG, accept the agreement as 
consistent with the goals of non-proliferation, it undermines the regime’s 
determinacy by creating a moral hazard that tempts other supplier nations 
to capture markets of nuclear ambitious countries with unsafeguarded 
facilities. 
Part III briefly described the protracted and easily aggravated tensions 
between India and Pakistan, which will only be inflamed by the United 
States liberalizing nuclear trade with India. Given the dearth of legal re-
gimes in South Asia governing weapons proliferation, the United States 
is relying on India’s assurances that it will exercise restraint in its nuclear 
weapons program and hoping that Pakistan’s incentive to proliferate will 
be mitigated by bringing India’s civilian facilities under IAEA safe-
guards.205 
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For its part, India recently passed a bill promulgating guidelines for 
nuclear transfers, amending its own Atomic Energy Act of 1962.206 It 
generally adopts a principle of non-proliferation, prohibits export of nu-
clear technology directed towards development of nuclear weapons, re-
quires IAEA safeguards to apply to any recipient of its exports, and re-
serves the right to place special controls on sensitive exports as a matter 
of national policy.207 As reassuring as this piece of domestic legislation 
may be, it is no guarantee that the U.S.-India partnership will avoid the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the sub-continent. Furthermore, it is 
no substitute for legal obligations that emanate from the well established 
multilateral non-proliferation regime. Therefore, the foregoing legal con-
siderations taken together lead to the inescapable conclusion that the 
U.S.-India Strategic Nuclear Partnership deals a debilitating blow to the 
non-proliferation regime. 
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